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Abstract 
 
Background: After more than a decade of implementation, the outcomes of decentralisation in 
Indonesia, particularly for the health sector are still obscure. Government health expenditure in 
a number of districts has increased considerably, but despite this health system performance to 
a large extent seems unaffected, calling into question how health stakeholders actually interpret 
local needs and how this interpretation can influence the consequent process for developing 
health programs. The main objective is to reveal the impact of decentralisation on health 
programs. Methods: In order to explore the complexity of the process, thirty-six stakeholders 
from eight different districts were interviewed, individually. These stakeholders consisted of 
representatives of the executive and legislative bodies, and the head of the district health office. 
Using purposive sampling, districts as the unit of analysis were selected on the basis of different 
degrees of fiscal strength and of urbanisation. The data were explored using framework 
approach. Results: One feature of decentralisation was the transfer of central government-that 
includes the discretion to develop and financing local initiative health programs to the local 
governments. However, the extent of health programs in each local government depends on 
factors such as local fiscal capacity, regulations, and the political process. In the case of 
Jamkesda, local fiscal capacity will determine the coverage and benefit of the health scheme 
that usually was supported by local regulations. However, the amount of local budget allocated 
for Jamkesda, relied greatly on the political process. The role of Jamkesda as a vote-getter for 
local politicians is significance, both in term of local commitment (budget allocation and 
regulation) and the sustainability of the program. Conclusion: Decentralisation has changed 
the development of local health program, nevertheless, the scope of local initiative health 
programs is determined by local fiscal capacity and the political process.  
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1. Introduction 
Today, around 80% of developing countries worldwide, including Indonesia, have 
decentralized public services in various forms.
(1)
 This trend is partly influenced by domestic 
demands but was also encouraged by international agencies such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the European Union. Some public sectors, such as 
education and poverty alleviation, have seemed to perform well with decentralisation, but 
this is not always so with health care.
(2)
 Studies carried out on the impact of decentralisation 
on health care show that results have been mixed. According to a study conducted in 
Indonesia by Simatupang, several public health measures, such as the infant mortality rate 
and life expectancy, have progressed well after decentralisation
(3)
; however another study 
by Heywood and Choi in the same country indicated that other health indicators, such as 
vaccination of children and mothers, deteriorated following decentralisation.
(4)
 These results, 
however, should be treated cautiously. Some indicators may not be causally associated 
with decentralisation. Heywood and Choi further explained that some improvement in health 
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indicators, such as contraceptive use and skilled attendants at labour and delivery, for 
instance, was more likely due to private sector utilisation rather than public service 
provision. 
One of the main problems that some local governments in Indonesia face after 
decentralisation is limited access to funding, as indicated by Kristiansen and Santoso.
(5)
 
Even though decentralisation policy allocates local governments a number of shared 
revenues from natural resources and tax, in addition to block grants, the distribution is still 
one-sided with a relatively larger proportion being allocated to the central government. As a 
result, some local governments feel that, despite greater power in decision-making 
processes, the ability to exercise this power is limited due to the disparity in revenue 
allocations.   
Kristiansen and Santoso revealed in their study that a lack of sufficient funding in 
Indonesia has encouraged more community health centres, or puskesmas, to become self-
sufficient, for example by charging additional fees. This approach has been furthered by the 
latest regulation that allows such puskesmas fees to be used to support operational costs 
and improve employee welfare instead of transferring them to the central government. 
Puskesmas is a community health centre in the sub-district level that provides basic health 
services for approximately 30,000 people. Because of additional fees, lower-income families 
were withdrawing from the facilities,
(6)
 further jeopardizing health status amongst the lower 
income group. The practice of ‘privatizing' puskesmas could broaden the existing gap 
between the financially stable and lower income groups. As pointed out by Lanjouw et al, 
public health centres have been the most common place where the lower income group 
receives health services as few people access public hospitals.
(7)
 It is a concerning 
situation. Although Indonesia’s population living below the poverty line has decreased in 
recent years, both in absolute numbers and proportionally, there are still 60 million people 
who are categorized as near-poor
(8)
 and there is not much difference between both the poor 
and the near-poor. Inflation or a catastrophe could easily push the near-poor to below the 
poverty line. 
A possible reason for local governments allocating insufficient funding to health 
budgets may be poor judgment on the part of local decision makers. Even though health 
expenditure could lead to better service provision and health outcomes
(9)
,
 
it depends on how 
the decision makers allocate the resources. A larger share of health expenditure is not 
always directly proportional to improved health services.
(10)
 Health office (in the region) 
capacity on local condition as well as public active involvement would be a prerequisite for 
achieving this. A localized decision-making process is fundamental in decentralisation. 
However, studies on this particular aspect of decentralisation are few. How decentralisation 
is perceived by local health stakeholders and how health policy is developed at the local 
level is important to be examined. Likewise, also the role of local interpretation and 
characteristics in decision making as the local government must take into account local 
aspirations and resources. What is deemed by outsiders to be poor policy may be 
‘understandable' to local people due to local circumstances. Therefore, before jumping to a 
conclusion regarding whether decentralisation is advantageous or disadvantageous to 
health-related indicators, it is necessary to conduct a thorough study of how the policy is 
perceived and implemented.  
From the above descriptions, there are two noticeable aspects of previous studies on 
decentralisation. First, the impression of decentralisation as being ambiguous to health-
related indicators, and second, the tendency to focus more on local health indicators or 
other health-related indicators, such as the health budget or inequality of access, and less 
on the process of decentralisation itself. In response to this situation, this article focuses on 
the process and practice of decentralisation as implemented by local government, 
particularly in regard to local government discretion in health. This article aims to discuss 
how decentralisation is practised at the local level, particularly in terms of the implications 
for local government interpretation of central government health policy. 
 
2. Method 
The aim of this study was to explain the implications of Indonesia's policy of 
decentralisation on local government discretion in health. Consistent with this aim, 
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descriptive and exploratory qualitative analysis was utilized. In all, forty-seven stakeholders 
were contacted, and thirty-six agreed to be interviewed, twenty-three male and thirteen 
female (Figure 1). They were selected due to their position in the government or local 
House of Representatives with an assumption that holder of certain public positions such as 
the district secretary and the head of district health office have in-depth knowledge on the 
local decision-making process. However, as this study needs to explore the changes 
caused by decentralisation on the decision-making process, only those who were already in 
office for at least three years were finally chosen to participate. The respondents were 
clustered as follows: 
a) Four participants from the district executive consisting of one district head and three 
district secretaries. 
b) Four participants from the district legislature consisting of one chairman of a district 
House of Representatives and three chairmen from the commission supervising health 
care.  
c) Twenty-four participants from various district technical agencies consisting of fourteen  
persons from district health offices (five heads of health office and nine staff, mostly the 
head of planning and budgeting sections), six participants from district hospitals (one 
hospital director and five staff, mostly the heads of planning and budgeting sections), 
one participant from a district planning office, two participants from a district research 
office, and one participant from a district office. 
d) Four participants from the provincial health office to account for likely different 
perspectives and roles in decentralisation 
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This study was conducted in eight districts across two different provinces, with four 
districts from the Special Region of Yogyakarta, namely Gunungkidul, Kulon Progo, 
Sleman, and the municipality of Yogyakarta, and another four districts from the province of 
East Kalimantan including the districts of Kutai Kartanegara, Bulungan and the 
municipalities of Balikpapan and Samarinda. The districts were selected to facilitate 
investigation of patterns of the decision-making process, other decentralisation related 
practices and the relationship of these with differing proximity to central government, fiscal 
ability, and demographics. From the eight selected districts three were urban, four were 
rural, and one was an urbanized rural district. In general, each district has its own specific 
characteristics in terms of demography, geography and economic capacity. 
In order to assure that this study upholds all participants dignity, rights, safety and well-
being, we registered and received ethical clearance from the Human Research Ethics 
University of Adelaide. 
 
2.1.  The Framework Approach 
For this study, I used the framework approach that is suited for policy-relevant 
qualitative research. This approach is particularly useful as it provides systematic stages for 
analyzing the data, from initial data management to the development of descriptive and 
explanatory accounts, as pointed out by Smith.
(11)
 In addition, as emphasized by Ritchie and 
Lewis, the approach also provides a transparent track of the researcher's interpretation
(12)
, 
therefore the approach supports study validity. 
The framework approach is a qualitative method that, unlike other qualitative analysis, 
tolerates the use of deductive reasoning in its approach. In fact, it combines deductive 
reasoning through the researcher’s a priori issue and inductive reasoning through 
respondent-generated themes to develop the research framework.
(13)
 In general, the 
method consists of two sequential activities: data management, where data is synthesized 
and simplified using a combination of thematic and case analysis, followed by data 
interpretation. The use of both analytical techniques ensures the themes extracted during 
the synthesizing process do not lose their context. The framework approach generates 
three different types of analytical output: categories of things (thematic), categories of 
people or processes (typologies) and explanatory
(14)
 that are useful to answer various types 
of research questions. The framework approach involves a four-stage process of 
familiarisation, indexing, charting, and mapping and interpretating. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
Decentralisation in Indonesia brought considerable changes to the role of local 
government in regard to public services. Prior to decentralisation, local initiatives in health 
programs, if any, were strictly monitored by the central authority as suggested by the 
hierarchical lines of coordination between central and local governments. Even though 
coordination lines were intended to improve health program effectiveness it was apparent 
that the balance of power between local and central government was skewed. Local 
governments were co-opted to work alongside central government bureaucracy to 
implement central-derived health programs. Changes brought by decentralisation 
redressed, at least initially, this power imbalance. With the newly gained power, local 
government has the authority to develop local initiatives by absorbing and synchronizing 
locally-derived proposals and at the same time taking into account central regulation and 
policies as part of the top-down process. 
 
3.1. Public Policy: the Local Initiative 
In general, public policy is defined as the actions that a governmental entity 
undertakes.
(15)
 Public policy is often associated with the government as only the government 
has the authority and power to govern the people with the purpose of developing public 
justice, involvement, and prosperity.
(16)
 The policy of decentralisation brought significant 
changes as the central government yielded significant power to local governments. One 
virtue of decentralisation is the relative freedom to which local government is entitled. 
Instead of awaiting ‘instruction' from a central authority or their agencies, local government 
has the power to develop health policy within the designated corridor. The power to plan 
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under decentralisation brings a responsibility to benefit the public. However, it is not a 
boundless freedom. The local power is still bounded by central regulations and policies.    
 
3.1.1. The Relationship between Responsibility to Plan and Empowerment 
The power to plan a local health program can empower local government. This 
sense of local empowerment was the result of the devolution of authority from the central 
government to local governments. The local authorities refer to
(1)
 authority to plan a local 
program and implement it, and
(2)
 the authority to fund the program using local resources. 
A similar understanding of the term empowerment is also discussed by Ahmad and Abu 
Talib in their study among local communities and local government in Pakistan.
(17)
 These 
authors argue that local empowerment is associated with local government or community 
ability to participate actively in local decision making. Another study in an Ethiopian 
farming community conducted by Snyder et al also supports the concept of local 
empowerment as the ability of the local community or government to actively participate 
in planning and implementing local programs.
(18)
 In both studies, active participation 
generated locally responsive decisions that would eventually improve local wellbeing. The 
empowerment to which a number of local stakeholders in this study referred were 
confined to having authority to plan and execute local programs. This has less to do with 
the improvement of local ‘ability' and more to do with expanding local ‘authority'.   
Widespread use of the term authority, and not ability, is not surprising as the policy 
was designed to devolve authority, rather than promote local ability. Without exploration 
and analysis, respondent views on empowerment may be misleading. It can be argued 
that empowerment has as much to do with developing local ability as increasing local 
authority. Bennis and Nanus
(16)
 view empowerment as developing subordinate skills in 
management along with devolution of authority, or as Kanter
(17)
 suggests empowerment 
is the sharing of power between superiors and subordinates. The feeling of empowerment 
experienced by many respondents was very likely an expression of enfranchisement 
associated with the transition from powerlessness; a phenomenon similar to the 
experiences and feelings of minority groups (women, Afro-Americans and the people with 
different abilities), as pointed out by Conger and Kanungo.
(18)
 Further the respondent 
added that in fact there is a difference between the power to execute and ability to 
execute local policy. In terms of local ability, there seems to have been little change under 
decentralisation. 
A study conducted by Indonesia’s Central Planning Agency on the capacity of local 
government planners in eleven districts and four provinces revealed that generally local 
capacity is still low and needs improvement.
(19)
 Findings of that study pointed indicated a 
lack of access to technology and information, in addition to limited work experience. 
However, it would be unfair to assume that all districts or all staff within the same district 
are homogenous. During fieldwork, I met with a number of local planners who have a 
clear vision and a well-developed systematic plan to achieve. Nevertheless, whether or 
not the plan can be implemented depends on the support of other local parties, 
particularly the local House of Representatives. In addition, some respondents pointed out 
that a good plan is meaningless unless strong support is given by the implementer in the 
field. The problem of disparity in capacity seems to hinder local progress in developing 
capacity. When decentralisation was implemented, people expected local ability would 
follow and become well developed when local governments utilized the newly designated 
authority, but it appears that improvements in local human resources move at a slower 
pace than devolution of power to local government.   
 
3.1.2. The Role of Local Government Commitment in Supporting Health Program 
In order to be implemented, a local health program proposed by the local health 
office must receive support from local government or local commitment, referring to active 
support
 
from the bupati and local House of Representatives that has the defining role in 
authorizing local programs.
(20)
 Local government commitment can materialize in various 
forms. For example, with the intention to increase public access to basic health services 
this commitment could be in the form of providing funding, building more puskesmas, 
recruiting more physicians, diversifying the availability of health services, and/or issuing 
local regulations. 
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3.1.3. Local Government Commitment: Local Regulation  
Local regulation, or peraturan daerah, is the first manifestation of local government 
commitment explored in this section. While not all health programs need to be regulated, 
peraturan daerah has a significant role in certain health programs. Any initiative for local 
regulation is proposed by the local House of Representatives and must be approved by 
the bupati. The regulation itself has a number of functions, such as to interpret the higher 
regulation, support local policy, promote local diversity and improve public welfare,
(21)
 but 
it could be also used to protect local policy and ensure sustainability of local programs. In 
some cases where local initiatives interfere with central government policy, local 
regulation acted as a guarantee, ensuring the legality of policy and, therefore, 
sustainability of the local health program. Also, local regulations also serve to increase 
public awareness and participation. In some cases, the local regulation also regulates 
sanctions in order to encourage public participation even though the sanction is rarely 
applied. Local health programs supported by peraturan daerah tend to receive special 
attention, particularly in the form of financial support. 
 
3.1.4. Local Government Commitment: Fiscal Support and Fiscal Utilisation 
The second aspect of local commitment is in the form of financial support provided by 
local government. In order to provide financial support, it is important that the local 
government has strong fiscal ability and involves the head of local government and local 
House of Representatives. The budget, proposed by the bupati in the case of a district 
and governor in case of a province, must receive support from the district or provincial 
House of Representatives, respectively. In Indonesia, the budget is called Anggaran 
Pendapatan Belanja Daerah (APBD). Generally, it covers local revenue, sources of 
revenue and proposed expenditure for a specific year. The APBD indicates the 
commitment of the local government in specific sectors, such as healthcare, education 
and other public services. The APBD may also indicate the local fiscal capacity in general.    
The importance of local fiscal capacity has been studied from various perspectives. 
For example, Zhang discusses the strong relationship between local fiscal capacity and 
provision of public goods.
(22)
 This author adds that accessible public goods are an 
investment to support development in other sectors. A Chinese study, conducted by 
Uchimura and Jütting, demonstrated an association between local government fiscal 
capacity and improvement in the infant mortality rate.
(23)
 However, higher local 
government fiscal capacity has its own hazards, particularly if funds are ill-used. Rather 
than supporting local health or other public services, higher fiscal capacity may induce 
local elites to allocate larger budgets for their own vested interests
(24)
 or districts with a 
stronger fiscal ability may misuse funds to increase salaries of the local elite.
(25)
 
Nonetheless, local fiscal capacity has a considerable influence on local health programs. 
In local districts with a relatively strong fiscal ability, budget allocation is relatively flexible. 
The lack of fiscal capacity means that local government often has to prioritize and 
make difficult decisions by supporting some activities and rejecting others. However, this 
does not mean that the cheapest program is automatically prioritized. The local health 
program priority setting is not all based on unsound judgment. The situation in districts is 
complicated as some districts lack of resources, poor coordination or a lack of concern 
impact on the development of a health program. My observation is that some programs 
are selected based on the fact that the program has been implemented for many years. 
Thus, given the longevity of the program, an examination of effectiveness is overlooked. 
This was particularly true for programs that are funded by the national government where 
the interventions are implemented based on what has been dictated by the central 
government. Some programs may be based on a well-thought consideration, such as 
research evidence or local experience. However, economic evaluation in local program 
priority setting currently has a limited role as is the case in other countries, as pointed out 
by Torgerson.
(26) 
 
 
3.2. Jamkesda, the Local Health Coverage Program: a Local Health Program 
After decentralisation, local health programs and policy are determined by local 
government commitment and local financial resources. Local health policy and programs 
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are more the results of the interaction between policy content, local actors, context, and 
processes, as identified by Walt and Gilson,
(27)
 rather than clear-cut sequential stages of 
agenda setting, formulation, implementation, and evaluation as suggested by Brewer and 
deLeon.
(28)
  
The localized process of decision making and empowerment of local government has 
polarised local self-identification through consolidation of local identity. Brown highlighted 
how local identity, be it ethnicity, religion or socio-historical characteristics, has 
strengthened with the introduction of decentralisation.
(29)
 For some ethnic groups, the policy 
of decentralisation in Indonesia presented an opportunity to reposition their ethnicity in a 
unitary state. The overt expression of ethnic identity and other potentially divisive activities, 
in Indonesia, abbreviated as SARA (ethnic, religion and race relations), let alone politicking, 
and were prohibited by the New Order regime in the name of national unity. However, as 
the central government position weakened with the introduction of decentralisation, local 
elites used local symbols to revive localized solidarity and identity. This was particularly 
visible in the tendency of the on-going ‘pemekaran’ or proliferation of provinces and districts 
frequently based on ethnic and religious lines.
(30)
 The new districts and provinces, even 
among those that appeared to be genuinely committed to improving public services, 
subsequently strengthened ethnic identity, as shown by Seitte
(31)
 and Hasanudin.
(32)
  
The most visible expression of ethnicity as local identity is shown during local elections 
where candidates accentuate closeness to local voters by using local symbols, such as 
dress, language and traditional ceremonies, as discussed by Duncan
 
and Buehler.
(33);(34)
 In 
more heterogeneous districts and provinces though, election candidates (bupati or 
governor) are deliberately selected to reflect the two major ethnic groups or religions in that 
particular district or province. It is a common sight during local election campaigns to see 
the candidates' portraits in public spaces wearing the local dress or religious symbols to 
emphasize shared ethnicity or religion with most voters in the area.   
 
3.3. Developing the Jamkesda 
Local identification by emphasizing factor, in particular, ethnicity, was not always 
relevant and workable. Aspinall
(35)
 suggests that the waning of ethnicity as local identity was 
due to the absence of ethnic and regional parties, with the exception of Aceh, and ineffective 
institutionalisation of ethnicity at the local level. Erb and Sulistiyanto argued that while 
ethnicity was still regarded as an important mobilisation force in local elections, there was a 
gradual shifting to other factors, such as candidate performance, programs, media 
campaigns and links to the local power structure.
(36)
 A particular health program of interest 
was the Jamkesda, a local government program that aims to assist the public in paying their 
health care costs. Jamkesda was started from various local government initiatives to assist 
the public in accessing health services. 
The initiative to provide this type of assistance was partly a response to the central 
government program of Jamkesmas, the central government health coverage program for 
the poor, which started in 2004.
(37)
 However, the discourse about a more accessible health 
service had already drawn attention from local government and the public. One of the 
pioneers in developing the health coverage program was the district of Jembrana in Bali that 
initiated a free basic health and dental service in 2003. Later this innovation was imitated by 
other districts into a number of health schemes with different coverage and benefits, 
depending on local fiscal capacity. 
There seemed to be different roles of jamkesda between bupati and legislators on the 
one hand, and health practitioners in the district health office on the other. While bupati and 
legislators tend to use jamkesda as a vote buying strategy by providing generous benefits 
and coverage, the district office acts as a controller and is more cautious with local capacity 
in terms of human resources and fiscal capacity. However, as pointed out by Fatmawati, 
some local governments did realize what they have promised during the campaign and a 
number of them were fairly successful.
(38)
 The key was to use local resources efficiently and 
effectively and to this end, the role of district health office was very important. In terms of 
jamkesda, the program has expanded health cover that was only partly achieved by the 
central government health cover, such as jamkesmas for the poor, askes for government 
civil servant, jamsostek for formal workers and asabri for the military personnel. According to 
National Health Ministry data, the jamkesda has contributed to health cover of around 33 
Kes Mas: Jurnal Fakultas Kesehatan Masyarakat  
ISSN: 1978 - 0575   
 
Decentralisation in Indonesia: The Impact on Local Health…..(Muhammad Syamsu Hidayat) 
75 
million people, or approximately 14% of the population in 2011, while central government 
schemes accounted for slightly over 50% of the population.
(39)
 However, health schemes, 
including central government schemes, have so far have not reinforced the quality of health 
care, as pointed out by Aspinall.
(40)
  
The study shows that decentralisation has put the district government in the spotlight. 
However, due to resource differences and local political process across the districts, central 
government role is still crucial in assuring that the disparity in outcome, be it in health and 
education, is not widening. Further, the study is necessary to explore the influence of 
decentralisation in other districts as this study only covers eight out of more than five 
hundred districts in Indonesia. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The development of local health programs was influenced by numerous factors. The 
first factor was local capacity. Decentralisation has devolved the authority to plan, develop, 
and implement health program to local governments. However, this does not mean that 
local ability to carry out the authority has moved at the same pace. There is a strong 
indication that local actors' capacities were unevenly distributed. 
The second factor was a political process. Even if a local health program has gone 
through a proper evaluation and priority setting by local government, the final decision will 
depend on the political process in the local House of Representatives. The roles of local 
legislators were therefore important in supporting local health programs. This support is 
manifest in the local regulation and financial provision, both of which are known as local 
commitment. The process relies on negotiation between bupati and local legislators. This 
situation has made the political process a profound factor in local health decision making.  
Jamkesda is one of the few local health programs that was less associated with the 
central government and as such it has contributed to two local impacts: public preference in 
electing the bupati and the strengthening of the local feature. In terms of public preference 
in local elections, local solidarity through shared ethnicity and socio-historical background 
which used to be crucial in local elections has shifted to local programs, such as Jamkesda, 
that have more profound and real benefits to the public. The importance of ethnicity and 
socio-historical background has not gone away. However, their role has diminished 
considerably in local politics particularly in the eight selected districts in this study. 
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